Conflict in Sudan will exacerbate instability in Chad.
The worsening security situation in Sudan creates significant spillover risks for neighbouring Chad, owing to the movement of a large number of refugees, a reduced security presence in border regions and worsening humanitarian conditions.
Even before violence broke out in Sudan on April 15th, some 400,000 refugees from Sudan were already residing in Chad, and the UN estimates that more than 250,000 people could cross into Chad from Sudan in the coming months as the conflict continues. However, large parts of Chad face acute food insecurity, particularly among the refugee population, exacerbated by ongoing insecurity and poor harvests, and we expect this to get worse in the short term as more refugees arrive.
Alongside the flow of refugees, some soldiers and members of the security forces are also reported to have crossed the border from Sudan into Chad. Adding to the insecurity, weapons are regularly shipped along established smuggling routes between the two countries. Flows of armed personnel and weaponry are likely to continue in the coming weeks as violence escalates in Sudan. Aid agencies operating in the region reported significant aid funding shortfalls, even before the recent outbreak of conflict, and a significant inflow of refugees and militia fighters into Chad will exacerbate the already poor humanitarian and security situation in the country.
Instability growing in border regions
In late January the governments of the Central African Republic and Chad and Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF, a paramilitary force involved in the current conflict in Sudan, fighting the Sudanese Armed Forces) signed a co‑operation agreement to jointly fight various rebel groups in the border regions, with the support of Russian security forces. The large gold mines in the border region are a hub for arms‑ and drug‑smuggling operated partly by rebel groups, and national armed forces have long been only sparsely present in these areas. The worsening conflict in Sudan will probably exacerbate insecurity in the region, as the RSF will need to ensure that its forces are divided between the border regions, to ensure that one of the main sources of illicit revenue does not dry up, and trying to control Sudan’s capital, Khartoum, as well as other key locations in the country.
An escalation of violence in Darfur (a region in western Sudan that borders Chad and the scene of a brutal conflict in 2003‑20) would leader to wider insecurity, given the tribal dimension of much of the tension there. Sudan’s western border has long been extremely porous, allowing for the relatively free and unchecked movement of arms and militia fighters alike. Darfur is host to a multitude of active and former rebel groups and tribal militias, which will be increasingly drawn into the ongoing factional fighting. General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti, the leader of the RSF) and the RSF draw their ranks largely from the ethnic Rizegat Arab tribe, which is also present in parts of Chad and Libya. The RSF will leverage its ethnic and political linkages in Chad to recruit armed militias to bolster its ranks.
Military rule could be extended, but sanctions less likely
Chad’s former president, Idriss Déby, was killed in a rebel attack in April 2021, and a military government, led by Mahamat Déby (his son), subsequently took over. An 18‑month transition timetable was agreed with the African Union (AU) and other international partners, including the EU and the US, to facilitate the transition to civilian rule and allow the holding of elections.
The AU provided diplomatic and military support to the army when it assumed power in April 2021 and did not classify the event as a coup, owing to the immediate security threat that Chad faced from rebel groups, which the AU deemed as an “exceptional situation”—and thus did not impose sanctions on the government or suspend it from the AU at that time. The AU nonetheless issued preconditions, including the rejection of any extension of the original 18‑month transition timetable and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. However, no sanctions were imposed on the government following the announcement in October 2022 that civilian elections would be delayed until October 2024, as the “exceptional situation” was judged to be ongoing.
We believe that Chad’s military government might argue that the potential humanitarian and security crisis stemming from the instability in Sudan justifies a further extension of military government, pushing back the transition to civil rule again. Chad has the region’s strongest counter‑terrorism force, owing to its intelligence and security capabilities, and significant political unrest in the country stemming from the fall of the Déby regime would be highly destabilising for the region. Chad’s international partners will be keen to ensure relative political stability and will thus continue to support the military government, making the imposition of punitive sanctions (in response to delayed elections or the rising authoritarianism of the regime) less likely.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit
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